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Abstract 
A challenging goal of psychology and neuroscience is to map cognitive 
functions onto neuroanatomical structures. This paper shows how computational 
methods based upon evolutionary algorithms can facilitate the search for 
satisfactory mappings by efficiently combining constraints from neuroanatomy 
and physiology (the structures) with constraints from behavioural experiments 
(the functions). This methodology involves creation of a database coding for 
known neuroanatomical and physiological constraints, for mental programs 
made of primitive cognitive functions, and for typical experiments with their 
behavioural results.  The evolutionary algorithms evolve theories mapping 
structures to functions in order to optimize the fit with the actual data.  These 
theories lead to new, empirically testable predictions. The role of the prefrontal 
cortex in humans is discussed as an example.  This methodology can be applied 
to the study of structures or functions alone, and can also be used to study other 
complex systems. 
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Evolving structure-function mappings in cognitive neuroscience using genetic 
programming 
 A primary aim in science is to develop theories that summarize and unify 
a large body of experimental data. However, there is no overarching theory in 
psychology (or even in subfields of psychology, such as the study of memory, 
emotions or perception) which imposes order on the mass of data and makes it 
possible to derive quantitative predictions, in the way, for example, quantum 
mechanics can be used to organize empirical data in chemistry.  To compound the 
difficulty, there are currently around 1,500 journals devoted to scientific 
psychology.  A substantial proportion of these journals publish mainly 
experimental results. Psychology is not exceptional: in sciences from astrophysics 
to meteorology to biology, technological progress has enabled the rapid collection 
of huge amounts of data. How can scientists keep track of this exponentially 
increasing amount of information, in spite of their bounded rationality?  
 While progress in database management of scientific results is notable, 
there remains the question of how this new information can foster scientific 
understanding, as opposed to simple accumulation of knowledge. A particularly 
interesting approach is to develop theories implemented as computer programs 
which account for, and therefore summarize, empirical data.  
 How scientific theories are developed has been the focus of a number of 
studies in psychology, philosophy, history, and, more recently, artificial 
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intelligence (e.g., Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1977; Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & 
Zytkow, 1987; Gholson, Shadish, Neimeyer, & Houts, 1989). In psychology, 
researchers have proposed a variety of explanations, including intuition 
(Hadamard, 1945), heuristic search (Simon, 1977), as well as random variation 
and Darwinian selection (Simonton, 1999). If the process of scientific discovery 
can be described precisely in information-processing terms, as argued forcefully 
by Langley et al. (1987), it should be possible to automate it—thus alleviating 
researchers’ task of dealing with an exponentially increasing quantity of 
information. 
 The goal of this paper is to help psychologists and other scientists develop 
powerful theories explaining complex data. This is done by offering a 
methodology which, combined with other informatics techniques (Kanehisa, 
2000; Koslow & Huerta, 1997), could help solve the problem of information 
overload in science.  This methodology consists of powerful search methods 
(evolutionary computation) aimed at automatically developing theories. As an 
illustrative example, we have chosen the question of the localization of cognitive 
functions in the brain, and, more specifically, of the role of the prefrontal cortex—
a difficult and topical research question. Given the readership of this journal, we 
are not so much interested in discussing the technical details underlying the 
computational implementation of our approach as in pointing the presence of 
potentially powerful methods to psychologists and philosophers. 
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The role of the prefontal cortex in humans 
 An important goal in biological psychology and neuroscience is to map 
cognitive processes onto neuroanatomical structures. Currently, a massive amount 
of data is being collected using such approaches as fMRI and lesion studies with 
non-human primates. However, neuroscientists have been increasingly worried 
about their limits to assimilate information from empirical research (Purpura, 
1997). Research into the prefrontal cortex offers a striking example of this 
situation. 
 In line with research on monkeys (Parker & Gaffan, 1998), this area of the 
cortex is assumed to be involved in working memory, planning, decision making, 
the acquisition of behavioural strategies, emotions, and motivation (Roberts, 
Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1998).  However, progress in mapping structures to 
functions in the prefrontal cortex lags behind advances in those brain areas 
underpinning perceptual processing. Indeed, no current theory is able to account 
for even a small subset of the data—posing a sufficient challenge to test the 
validity of our methodology. 
The problem of mapping brain structures to functions 
 Structure-to-function mapping in the prefrontal cortex is difficult for three 
reasons: 
18/5/07 6 
1. Our understanding of prefrontal cortical anatomy (both functional and 
structural), particularly in humans, is less developed than for other parts of the 
brain (e.g., visual cortex). 
2. Many different mental programs (i.e., organized sequences of serial and 
parallel cognitive processes) may instantiate the same pattern of behavioural 
data, making search through the space of possible mental programs difficult. 
3.  The mapping between the two domains, a difficult task in itself, is made more 
difficult by the uncertainties in our knowledge of human neuroanatomy and the 
processes involved in mental programs. 
 We therefore face a typical problem of optimizing search through multiple 
spaces.  Hitherto, most research has addressed this question using informal 
theories, a weak method given the size of the search space.  Moreover, modelling 
has not been applied to solving the mapping problem itself, but instead to provide 
functional mechanisms for simulating empirical data (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; 
Cohen, Braver & O’Reilly, 1998; Dehaene & Changeux, 1995). We propose that 
the mapping problem can be tackled by using the powerful search methods 
offered by evolutionary computation. 
Computational scientific discovery 
 Scientific research can be described as heuristic search in combinatorial 
spaces (Langley et al., 1987; Simon, 1977).  ‘Combinatorial’ means that, at each 
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choice point, many decisions are possible. This combinatorial explosion implies 
that the search space drastically outgrows human capacities to explore it. To 
circumvent these limits, research in artificial intelligence has developed efficient 
search techniques in order to devise new laws, theories, and concepts.  These 
techniques, used either autonomously or semi-autonomously, have been 
successfully applied in sciences such as chemistry, biology, mathematics (e.g., 
Bollobas & Riordan, 1998; Valdés-Pérez, 1999; Xu, Mural, Einstein, Shah, & 
Eberbacher, 1996). 
 One class of computational search techniques is evolutionary computation, 
which includes genetic algorithms (Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1992; Mitchell, 
1996) and genetic programming (Koza, 1992; 1994). Inspired by natural 
selection, evolutionary computation enacts a search for solutions to the problem 
of survival. It evolves large populations of genotypes (possible solutions) with the 
constraint that the fittest (best) tend to survive and reproduce.  Artificial 
genotypes encode sets of parameters with genetic algorithms, or entire programs 
with genetic programming.  What constitutes a ‘solution’ is governed by a fitness 
function determined by the specific problem at hand. For example, if the problem 
is to optimize the fit of a mathematical function to a set of empirical data, the 
amount of variance accounted for may be used as the fitness measure. The 
mathematical foundation of evolutionary computation is well established 
(Holland, 1992). 
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 While computationally simple, these algorithms are robust and powerful. 
Being less sensitive to local minima and to initial conditions than other hill-
climbing methods (Koza, 1992), they can explore huge search spaces efficiently 
and in parallel, even when the information is noisy and subject to uncertainty.  
These algorithms have been used extensively in science and engineering, for 
example in function optimisation, pattern recognition, functional genomics, and 
the analysis of noisy data (Kanehisa, 2000; Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1996; 
Koza, 1992, 1994). Recent neuroscientific applications include diagnostic 
discovery (Kentala, Laurikkala, Pyykko, & Juhola, 1999), neuromuscular 
disorders assessment (Pattichis & Schizas, 1996), and interpretation of magnetic-
resonance brain images (Sonka, Tadikonda, & Collins, 1996). 
Genetic-programming algorithms 
 We propose to use a variant of evolutionary computation called genetic 
programming (Koza, 1992, 1994).  Instead of acting on digital chromosomes, as 
do genetic algorithms, genetic programming evolves entire computer programs.  
This removes some of the limitations of classical genetic algorithms (mainly, 
necessity to use fixed-length chromosomes, difficulty in representing hierarchical 
structures; and lack of dynamic variability; cf. Koza, 1992). The hierarchical 
structure of these programs is also convenient for simulating human mental 
programs. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 Programs are represented as trees, a common data structure in computer 
science, to allow ease of manipulation and evolution. For example, the function 
(A + (B * 2)) can be represented as a tree (Figure 1a). ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘2’ are called 
terminals and ‘+’ and ‘*’ are called operators. With simulated mental programs, 
operators consist of cognitive operations, and terminals of possible inputs. Figure 
1b encodes an elementary mental program that compares two perceptual inputs, 
and then outputs the outcome of the comparison. 
 
 Genetic programming involves four steps: 
 1. Choose a set of admissible operators and terminals. In the case of 
mental programs, these are cognitive operations and possible inputs, respectively. 
 2. Generate an initial population of trees. These trees use the set of 
admissible operators and terminals, and can be of different sizes and shapes. They 
may be generated either fully randomly, or as random variations of plausible 
programs, which can be derived from the literature. Syntactically incorrect trees 
are deleted.  
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 3. Calculate the fitness of each program.  The fitness is computed based 
on the performance of each program on a set of problems (‘fitness cases’), where 
both the input and the output are known. With mental programs, the fitness cases 
consist of behavioural data of humans performing prefrontal cortex tasks, where 
the fit is the amount of variance accounted for in the empirical data by the 
program. 
 4. Apply selection, crossover, and mutation.  Selection involves keeping a 
predetermined number of programs in the population, selected probabilistically in 
proportion to fitness.  Crossover refers to producing two offspring from a random 
point in each of the two parents and swapping the resultant subtrees (Figure 2).  
Mutation consists of replacing a subtree below a random point by a randomly 
created subtree. Typically, mutation has a much lower probability than crossover 
(Mitchell, 1996). 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 Genetic programming offers an efficient way of using feedback about a 
program’s fitness within a generation to breed the next generation. While the 
basic representation uses trees, with each node having a single parent, several 
techniques exist to implement cyclic or recursive function calls, such as 
‘automatically defined functions’ (Koza, 1994; Angeline & Pollack, 1992). 
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Searching through the space of mapping theories 
 Complex systems, both natural and artificial, are more likely to evolve 
from simple systems if they are organized as modules and hierarchies—i.e., if 
they contain stable intermediate forms (e.g., Simon’s, 1996, concept of near-
decomposability). Such hierarchical organisations have often been proposed for 
brain structures (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992), cognitive processes (Kosslyn & 
Koenig, 1992), and knowledge representations (Gobet, 2001; Gobet & Simon, 
2000; Newell, 1990).  While the assumption of brain modularity has been 
disputed (Elman et al., 1996; Uttal 2001), it is explicitly accepted by many 
researchers in neuroscience (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Shallice, 1992) and 
implicitly by most researchers using neuro-imaging techniques. 
 We assume that the interactions between elements are high within a 
subsystem of the hierarchy, but weak between subsystems (Simon, 1996). This 
assumption is important in that it simplifies the search space of the structure-to-
function mappings, because subsystems can be considered as units during 
simulated evolution.  This also enables the direct use of genetic-programming 
subtree-encapsulation methods (Koza, 1994). 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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 Figure 3 depicts the abstract relations formulated here. Four properties are 
important: (a) structures are organized hierarchically; (b) functions are organized 
hierarchically; (c) a one-to-one, one-to-many or a many-to-one mapping may link 
functions and structures (thus, the same elemental structure may implement 
multiple functions); and (d) in both hierarchies, some subtrees can be considered 
as modules. 
 A theory mapping structure to function (hereafter, mapping theory) 
comprises a 3-part system: (a) a hierarchy representing brain structures and their 
connections; (b) a hierarchy representing cognitive programs; and (c) the mapping 
between these two hierarchies. The same mapping theory is used across several 
tasks, providing an important constraint for selection.  
 Mapping theories are explicit, and therefore easily understood by humans.  
They can be manipulated and evolved as executable data structures. The key of 
our methodology is to evolve such mapping theories, using as a fitness function 
the extent to which they account for empirical data. While limiting the number of 
theories, thereby eliminating potentially successful theories, the mechanisms of 
evolutionary computation ensure that only viable theories are evolved.  These 
mechanisms also lead to diverse, sometimes incompatible theories that all account 
for the data equally well. This is a strength of our method, as these competing 
theories and the new predictions that are derived from them can be tested 
empirically.  
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 We can identify five main stages in our methodology: 
 1. Codification of current knowledge of anatomical structures, their 
connections, and their hierarchical organisation. This includes information about 
putative hierarchical organisation.  The databases are coded using trees for their 
later input to evolutionary algorithms.  
 2. Codification of current knowledge of cognitive processes implicated in 
prefrontal cortex tasks, and their hierarchical organisation. Although complex, 
each cognitive process can be viewed as an operation or series of operations.  
Each operation has two parameters: list of input values, list of output values. 
Based on these operations, programs for classical prefrontal cortex tasks, such as 
discrimination reversal, delayed match to sample, or Wisconsin Card Sort, can be 
written.  These programs use, as elementary operations, a limited set of processes 
gleaned from the literature (such as inhibition of visual information, maintenance 
of verbal information, matching of two visual pieces of information). The 
elementary processes are organized as subsystems, thus allowing a hierarchical 
organisation of the programs. There is no doubt that translating current theories 
into formal programs can result in a wide variety of different programs, possibly 
revealing inconsistencies across authors, or even within authors. These programs, 
used as the initial seed population, can be tested to ensure that they obtain 
performance similar to ‘normal’ participants, and thus are sufficient for the task. 
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 3. Preliminary mapping of the two types of knowledge. These two 
knowledge bases, and their mapping, are combined into mapping theories, again 
guided by the current literature.  Each operation has one or more cytoarchitectonic 
areas associated with it, as well as lists of input and output areas, and their 
respective values.  Operations may function properly only if the necessary cortical 
area is intact, and if the input and output areas, as well as their connections, are 
intact (in all cases, impairment may be only partial).  Information can also be 
encoded about the degree of confidence in the operation-area mapping. 
 4. Construction of a database of tasks containing empirical results; these 
tasks are then used to compute the fitness function of the mapping theories. To 
test the fit of the mapping theories to the empirical data requires the creation of a 
database of results from human studies using prefrontal cortex tasks, both with 
normal participants and brain-damaged patients. The database can also 
incorporate brain scan data.  It is then possible to compute the fitness of a given 
theory by applying it to a set of tasks and to a set of neurological damages, and to 
compare the predictions of the theory with the empirical data, using standard 
measures of goodness of fit such as r2 (amount of variance accounted for). 
 5. Use of genetic-programming techniques to optimize search between 
these two types of knowledge and their conjunction. The final stage uses 
evolutionary algorithms to optimize search through the spaces of structure and 
function as well as their conjunction. Several approaches can be used to search for 
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new and better hypotheses for the mapping of structures to processes: search of 
the space of structures, processes, and mappings, respectively, while keeping the 
two other spaces constant; search of two spaces while keeping the third space 
constant; and, finally, search through the three spaces simultaneously.  The role of 
the initial conditions and parameters of the system, such as mutation and 
crossover rate, can also be explored by systematically varying these conditions 
and parameters.  
A simplified  example 
 As an illustration, consider the delayed match to sample (DMTS) task. In 
this task, a stimulus is first presented for a given amount of time, followed by a 
delay. Then, two stimuli are presented, and the task is to select which of these two 
stimuli matches the stimulus presented first. This task has been extensively used 
with humans and non-human animals. In this example, we used the data of Chao, 
Haxby and Martin (1999), who studied humans. We chose this paper because the 
task (a) is simple, (b) uses only known stimuli, which makes it unnecessary to 
model any learning process, and (c) is short enough so that forgetting does not 
need to be taken into consideration, at least as a first approximation. We focused 
on two conditions: in the first, pictures of animals were presented as stimuli, and, 
in the second, pictures of tools were used.  We explain in some detail how our 
methodology can evolve (indeed, has evolved) functional theories with this task; 
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then, more briefly, we indicate how it could be used to evolve full mapping 
theories.  
 First, we programmed the task itself. We generated simplified versions of 
the stimuli used by Chao et al. (1999), by using pseudo-random sequences of 
digits. We then implemented the exact design in that paper, including the exact 
number of subjects, stimuli, and trials used.  
 Second, we selected a set of cognitive operations from the literature. 
These included operations for inputing a stimulus, storing information in short-
term memory (STM), and matching two stimuli. Operations were not fully 
deterministic, as they had a .02 probability of failing to produce the correct 
output. Based on the literature (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Gobet & Clarkson, 2004), we 
assumed that visual STM was limited to four items.  
 Third, we defined a fitness function, using the deviation percentage from 
the means and standard deviations of  the “animal” and “tool” conditions in Chao 
et al.’s (1999) study.  The deviation percentage was defined as: 
 
   ( | Theory – Observed |    /    Observed ) * 100 
 
where Observed refers to the human data, as provided by Chao et al., and Theory 
refers to the prediction of an evolved theory. As the experimental design is 
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exactly the same with the simulations as with the human data (see above), the 
observed and predicted means and standard deviations are directly comparable. 
 We also defined a hit measure. When an evolved theory obtained a value 
within 10% of the value observed with the human data, we arbitrarily counted this 
as a hit. For example, the condition “animal”  yielded a value of 1.4% for the 
standard deviation; the accepted range is therefore (1.26% - 1.54%); thus, 1.50% 
would be counted as a hit, but 1.60% would be counted as a miss. In this example, 
the fitness function was the sum of relative deviations; other functions are 
possible, such as the sum of hits, or the amount of variance explained by linear 
regression (r2). 
 Fourth, we let a modified version of genetic programming evolve the 
theories, starting with a population made of random trees. The fitness of each 
evolved theory was computed by running through the two conditions of Chao et 
al.’s (1999) experiment. In spite of the fact that only four fitness cases were 
available, the program managed to evolve interesting theories. For example, after 
14 generations, the program depicted in Figure 4 was produced. The top part of 
the Figure shows the (slightly edited) Lisp code of the theory evolved, and the 
bottom part a diagrammatic representation of this theory. In words, what this 
theory does is to store the first stimulus in STM, and then to store the second and 
third stimuli). Finally, the second and third elements in STM are compared. 
Because STM is implemented as a queue, new elements “push” older elements;  
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as a consequence, by the time the comparison takes place, stimulus #1 is in the 
third slot of STM, and stimulus #2 in the second slot.  The theory does a good job 
at predicting means, but is wide of the mark with standard deviations (see Table 
1). While rather modest, this theory shows that functional theories can be 
involved, at least in the conditions of these simulations. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The methodology discussed in this paper involves one additional—and 
important—complication: to use theories that combine structure and function. 
Figure 5, which was constructucted by the authors, and not generated 
automatically, shows such a possible mapping theory, extending the program 
shown in Figure 4. Note that the brain structure could be further specified; for 
example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex could be divised into Brodmann areas 
9 and 46. Chao et al. (1999) do not present data about the prefrontal cortex, but 
brain-imaging or patient data available elsewhere in the literature could be used to 
compute a more sophisticated fitness function that would include the information 
about brain structures. For example, if the empirical data show that the 
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is not engaged in this task, contrary to what the 
program states, then this would count against (the fitness value of) the theory.  
 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Role of constraints in reducing the search space 
Even when considering only the functional side of our approach, the number of 
possible mapping theories is theoretically infinite. In order to have practical 
chances to search this space successfully, it is necessary to use a number of 
heuristics that constrain search. For example, we have imposed a modular and 
hierarchical structure to the theories. We have also biased search by selecting the 
cognitive operations used, and not selecting others. In addition, we have chosen a 
given experiment, and not another. While the full application of our framework 
would incorporate more cognitive operations and more fitness cases, in addition 
to using full mapping theories, there is no doubt that (strong) assumptions will 
have to be used as constraints to make our method feasible—as is the case 
generally with optimization techniques. We refer the reader to the section 
“Searching through the space of mapping theories” for a discussion of some of 
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these, namely modularity and hierarchical organization of cognitive functions and 
brain structures.   
Likely objections 
 Our proposal is likely to raise a number of objections, and it is important 
to review some of them here. 
 1. The search space is too large. We agree that the search space is 
extremely large. However, we also believe that the use of current knowledge of 
psychology and neuroscience, as well as the use of heuristics such as the 
assumption of near-decomposability, helps cut down the size of this space. 
Moreover, evolutionary computation is one of the best methods to efficiently 
tackle large search spaces. Finally, new technologies such as grid computing may 
help mitigate the time needed to carry out search (Gobet & Lane, 2005). 
 2. The amount of information hampers the search process. We suggest 
that, on the contrary, the amount of information available constrains the search 
process, and then helps weed out poor candidate theories (cf. Newell, 1990). 
 3. Humans can do it without the help of this or of similar methodology.  
As noted in the introduction, information overload is a serious concern for 
psychology and neuroscience, and, indeed for most sciences. In addition, humans, 
including scientists, are prone to cognitive limitations that may seriously hamper 
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progress (Langley et al., 1987; Richman, Gobet, Staszewski, & Simon, 1996; 
Simon, 1989). 
 4. Too much bias is introduced by the selection of primitives, tasks, and 
fitness function. It is true that the choice of primitives for the brain structures and 
cognitive operations, as well as the choice of experiments and fitness function, 
determines and therefore biases the space of possible theories. It is also true that 
we may not have the right primitives and thus are searching in the wrong solution 
subspace. However, the same applies for psychologists and neuroscientists 
attempting to build these mappings, who, as we have just seen in the previous 
objection, may be ill-equipped computationally for carrying out this type of task.  
 5. Setting up the databases used for evolving theories represents a huge 
and tedious task. We agree with this point, but note that such databases would be 
useful on their own. Indeed, a substantial part of neuroinformatics currently 
consists in setting up databases encoding information about neuro-anatomical 
structures, neurophysiological processes, and behavioural results, to make that 
information available to other researchers. Even if the specific methodology 
proposed in this paper is found wanting, the databases can be reused in other 
projects aimed at modelling these data. 
 6. The methodology is purely inductive and unlikely to be successful. The 
first statement is not correct. As this methodology uses the current state of 
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scientific knowledge in the field, it is not “theory free,” but anchored in current 
neuroscientific theories. 
Conclusion 
 A major advantage of the methodology presented in this paper is that it 
enables selecting evolved theories that are consistent with most results contained 
in a given database. This avoids the selection biases that are unavoidable in 
informal theorizing and suggests an increased likelihood of finding theories to 
account for the empirical data while satisfying the constraints imposed. Another 
advantage is that the developed theories meet the criterion of sufficiency: being 
implemented as  computer programs, they can indeed carry out the tasks under 
study. 
 To our knowledge, this constitutes the first attempt to use artificial 
evolution to tackle the problem of structure-to-function mapping in neuroscience. 
While we do not deny that a number of conceptual and practical questions remain 
to be answered, we believe that the potential is high for this methodology. First, 
the techniques described here, illustrated by the study of the prefrontal cortex, can 
be easily generalized to other regions of the brain. Second, these techniques can 
also be applied to domains where the structure-to-function mapping relates to a 
finer level of analysis (e.g., neuronal and molecular level);  indeed, the exact level 
of explanation offered by these theories will depend on the primitives selected.  
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Third, while the focus in this paper is at the functional level, it is possible to 
further implement functions using neural nets. Fourth, the techniques can be used 
for each subcomponent of mapping theories in isolation (i.e., either functions or 
structures).  Fifth, they can be used in other sciences as well, as long as theories 
can be formalized as computer programs and matched to a database of empirical 
results. 
 Philosophers of science have often noted the evolutionary character of 
scientific knowledge (Toulmin, 1967; Popper, 1979). In this paper, we have 
proposed to use the evolutionary process not only as a description of the way 
science evolves, but also as a tool that can actively evolve new scientific theories. 
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Table 1.  
Mean and standard deviation of percentages of the “animal” and “tool” 
conditions, for the human data (Chao et al., 1999) and one of the evolved 
theories. 
 
 
       Measures 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
            Observed Evolved  Deviation             Hit 
Condition       theory            percentage 
 
“Animal”  
  mean  97       92      5.1     yes 
  sd    1.4         2.1   50.0      no 
 
“Tool”   
  mean   95        93      2.1    yes 
  sd                       1.2          3.1 158.3      no 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1.  Examples of genetic-programming trees. 
Figure 2.  Crossover in genetic programming. 
Figure 3.  Some properties of mapping theories. A given structure may map to 
several functions (narrow dashed arrows), conversely, a given function may map 
to several structures (thick dashed arrows).  A group of nodes denoting structures 
may be considered as a unit (subtree) mapping to a single function, and vice-versa 
(ellipses). 
Figure 4.  Example of an evolved functional theory. Top part: Lisp code of the 
evolved theory; bottom part: diagrammatic representation of this theory. Three 
primitive are used. PutStm puts a new element into STM. Progn2 allows the 
execution of two subtrees one after the other. Compare23 compares element 2 
and element 3 of STM.  
Figure 5. An illustration of how the functional theory of Figure 4 could be linked 
to brain structures. PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
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